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for the benefit of himself and family, such personal property as
he may have, and coming within the exemption hereby made.
But this section shall not be construed as authorizing the General
Assembly to defeat or impair the benefits intended to be conferred
by the provisions of this article.
By an Act of June 27th 1870 the General Assembly, in accordance with section 5 of the foregoing article of the Constitution, prescribed the mode of setting apart exempted property.
By this act the debtor may waive the benefit of the exemptions
given by the Constitution, but not those under the Act of 1867.
The mode of setting apart the homestead, &c., is elaborately
provided for.
J. 11. THOMAS,
Savannah, Ga.
(To be concluded in the next number.)
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CHARLES W. GODDARD v. THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY.
A common carrier of passengers is responsible for the wilful misconduct of his
servant toward a passenger.
A passenger who is assaulted and grossly insulted in a railway car by a brakeman employed on the train, has a remedy therefor against the company:
If a brakeman, employed on a railway passenger train, assault and grossly
insult a passenger thereon, and the company retain the offending servant in their
service after his misconduct is known to them, they will be liable to exemplary
damages.
The plaintiff, a highly respectable citizen, and a passenger in tie defendants'
railway car, on request, surrendered his ticket to a brakeman authorized to demand and receive it. Shortly after, the brakeman, without provocation, approached
the plaintiff in his seat, and, accosting him in a loud voice, denied, in the presence
of the other passengers, that he had seen or received the plaintiff's ticket, and in
language coarse, profane, and grossly insulting, called the plaintiff a liar, charged
him with then attempting to evade the payment of his fare, and with having done
so before ; and leaning over the plaintiff, then in feeble health and partially
reclining in his seat, and bringing his fist down close to his face, violently shook
it there, and threatened to split the plaintiff's head open and to spill his brains
right there on the spot, with much more to the same effect. The defendants,
although well knowing the brakeman's misconduct, did not discharge him, but
retained him in his place, which he continued to occupy at the time of the trial.
VoL. XIX.-2
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The jury was instructed that the case was a proper one for exemplary damages,
and they returned a verdict for $4850, which the court declined to set aside.

ON exceptions and motion to set aside the verdict as being
excessive.
Trespass for an alleged assault by a servant of the defendants,
in one of their cars, upon the plaintiff.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $4850. And
the defendants alleged exceptions.
r. F. Shepley, for the plaintiff.
P. Barnes, for the defendants, cited Derby v. Penna. Bailroad
Co., 14 How. 468, and cases there cited; Howe v. Newmarch, 12
Allen 56; Reeves's Dom. Relations 356, 358; Foster v. Essex
Bank, 17 Mass. 508 ; 2 Kent's Com. 259, 260 ; Story on Agency,
§ 318; Brown v. Purviance, 2 Harris & Gill 317; LIons v.
Martin, 8 Ad. & E. 514; Thames Steamboat Co. v. Railroad Co.,
24 Conn. 40; 1 Redfield on Railways 510-515; Pote v. Dill, 48
Maine 539, Rice's dissenting opinion; ifagan v. Prov. & War.
Railroad Co., 3 R. I. 188; Turner v. N. B. & H. Railroad Co.,
34. Cal. 594; Pleasant v. N. B. & H2.RailroadCo., 34 Cal. 586;
Finny v. Mil. & Wis. Railroad Co., 10 Wis. 338; Clarke' v.
Newson, 1 Exch. 131; Montfort v. Wordsworth, 7 Ind. 83;
Ripley v. Miller, 11 Ind. 247.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WALTON, J.-Two questions are presented for our consideration: first, is the common carrier of passengers responsible for
the wilful misconduct of his servant? or, in other words, if a
passenger who has done nothing to forfeit his right to civil treatment, is assaulted and grossly insulted by one of the carrier's
servants, can he look to the carrier for redress ? and, secondly,
if he can, what is the measure of relief which the law secures to
him ? These are questions that deeply concern, not only the
numerous railroad and steamboat companies engaged in the transportation of passengers, but also the whole travelling public ;and
we have endeavored to give them that consideration which their
great importance has seemed to us to demand.
I. Of the carrier's liability. It appears in evidence that the
plaintiff was a passenger in the defendants' railway car; that, on
request, he surrendered his ticket to a brakeman employed on the
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train, who, in the absence of the conductor, was authorized to
demand and receive it; that the brakeman afterwards approached
the plaintiff, and, in language coarse, profane, and grossly insulting, denied that he had either surrendered or shown him his
ticket; that the brakeman called the plaintiff a liar, charged him
with attempting to avoid the payment of his fare, and with having
done the same thing before, and threatened to split his head open
and spill his brains right there on the spot; that the brakeman
stepped forward and placed his foot upon the seat on ivich the
plaintiff was sitting, and, leaning over the plaintiff, brought his
fist close down to .his face, and shaking it violently, told him not
to yip, if he did he would spot him; that he was a damned liar,
that he never handed him his ticket; that he did not believe he
paid his fare either way; that this assault was continued some
fifteen or twenty minutes, and until the whistle sounded for the
next station; that there were several passengers present in the
car, some of whom were ladies, and that they were all strangers
to the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was at the time in feeble health,
and had been for some time under the care of a physician, and at
the time of the assault was reclining languidly in his seat; that
he had neither said nor done anything to provoke the assault;
that, in fact, he had paid his fare, had received a ticket, and had
surrendered it to this very brakeman who delivered it to the conductor only a few minutes before, by whom it was afterwards
produced and identified; that the defendants were immediately
notified of the misconduct of the brakeman, but instead. of discharging him, retained him in his place; that the brakeman was
still in the defendants' employ when the case was tried, and was
present in court during the trial, but was not called as a witness,
and no attempt was made to justify or excuse his conduct.
Upon this evidence the defendants contend that they are not
liable, because, as they say, the brakeman's assault upon the
plaintiff was wilful and malicious, and was not directly nor impliedly authorized by them. They say the substance of the whole
case is this, that "the master is not responsible as a trespasser,
unless by direct or implied authority to the servant he consents to
the unlawful act."
The fallacy of this argument, *hen applied to the common
carrier of passengers, consists in not discriminating between the
obligation which he is under to his passenger, and the duty which
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he owes a stranger. It may be true that if the carrier's servant
wilfully and maliciously assaults a stranger, the master will not
be liable; but the law is otherwise when he assaults one of his
master's passengers. The carrier's obligation is to carry his
passenger safely and properly, and to treat him respectfully,
and if he intrusts the performance of this duty to his servants,
the law holds him responsible for the manner in which they execute the trust. The law seems to be now well settled that the
carrier is obliged to protect his passenger from violence and
insult, from whatever source arising. He is not regarded as an
insurer of his passenger's safety against every possible source of
danger; but he is bound to use all such reasonable precautions
as human judgment and foresight are capable of, to make his
passenger's journey safe and comfortable. He must not only
protect his passenger against the violence and insults of strangers
and co-passengers, but a fortiori,against the violence and insults
of his own servants. If this duty to the passenger is not performed, if this protection is not furnished, but, on the contrary,
the passenger is assaulted and insulted through the negligence or
the wilful misconduct of the carrier's servant, the carrier is
necessarily responsible.
And it seems to us it would be cause of profound regret if the
law were otherwise. The carrier selects his own servants and
can discharge them when he pleases, and it is but reasonable that
he should be responsible fur the manner in which they execute
their trust. To their care and fidelity are intrusted the lives and
limbs and comfort and convenience of the whole travelling public,
and it is certainly as important that these servants should be
trustworthy as it is that they should be competent. It is not
sufficient that they are capable of doing well, if in fact they
choose to do ill; that they can be as polite as a Chesterfield, if,
in their intercourse with the passengers, they choose to be coarse,
brutal, and profane. The best security the traveller can have
that these servants will be selected with care, is to hold those by
whom the selection is made responsible for their conduct.
This liability of the master is very clearly expressed in a recent
case in Massachusetts. The court say, that wherever there is a
contract between the master and another person, the master is
responsible for the acts of his servant in executing that contract,
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although the act is fraudulent and done without his consent:
Bowe v. .Yewmarch, 12 Allen 55.
And TAIessrs. Angell & Ames, in their work on Corporations
(section 888, p. 404, 8th ed.), say: "A distinction exists as to
the liability of a corporation for the wilful tort of its servant
toward one to whom the corporation owes no duty except such as
each citizen owes to every other; and that toward one who has.
entered into some peculiar contract with the corporation by which
this duty is increased; thus it has been held that a railroad corporation is liable for the wilful tort of its servants whereby a
passenger on the train is injured."
In Brand v. 'ailroad,8 Barb. 868, the court say: "A passenger on board a stage-coach or railroad-car and a person on
foot in the street do not stand in the same relation to the carrier.
Toward the one the liability of the carrier springs from a contract,
express or implied, and upheld by an adequate consideration.
Toward the other he is under no obligation but that of justice
and humanity. Hence a passenger, who is injured by a servant
of the carrier, may have a right of action against him when one
not a passenger, for a similar injury, would not."
In Moore v. Railroad,4 Gray 465, the plaintiff was forcibly put
cut of a car for not giving up his ticket or paying his fare, when in
fact he had already surrendered his ticket to some one employed
on the train. The defendants insisted that they were not responsible for the misconduct of the conductor; and further, that an
action for an assault would not lie against a corporation. But
the court held otherwise, and the plaintiff recovered.
In Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 H. & N. 354, the plaintiff was
assaulted and taken out of the defendant's omnibus by one of his
servants. The defendant insisted that he was not liable, because
it did not appear that he authorized or sanctioned the act of the
servant. But it was held in the Exchequer Chamber, affirming
the judgment of the Exchequer Court, that the jury did right in
returning a verdict for the plaintiff.
In Railroadv. Pinney, 10 Wis. 388, the plaintiff was unlawfully put out of a car by the conductor. After stating that it
was insisted, by the counsel for the railroad, that in no case could
a cause of action arise against the principal for the wilful misconduct of the agent, the court went on to say that, after a
careful examination of the position, they were satisfied it was not
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correct; that where the misconduct of the agent causes a breach
of the principal's contract, he will be liable whether such misconduct be wilful or merely negligent.
In Railroad v. Vandiver, 42 Penn. St. R. 865, a passenger
received injuries, of which he died, by being thrown from the
platform of a railroad car because he refused to pay his fare or
show his ticket, he averring he had bought one but could not
find it. The evidence showed he was partially intoxicated. It
was urged in defence that if the passenger's death was the result
of force and violence, and not the result of negligence, then (such
force and violence being the act of the agents alone without any
command or order of the company), the company was not responsible therefor. But the court held otherwise. "A railway company," said the court, "selects its own agents at its own pleasure,
and it is bound to employ none except capable, prudent, and humane men. In the present case the company and its agents were
all liable for the injury done to the deceased."
In Weed v. Railroad,17 N. Y. 362, the jury found specially
that the act of the servant by which the plaintiff was injured was
wilful. The court held the wilfulness of the act did not defeat
the plaintiff's right to look to the railroad company for redress.
In Railroad v. Derby, 14 How. 468, where the servant of a
railroad company took an engine and ran it over the road for his
own gratification, not only without consent, but contrary to express orders, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the railroad company was responsible.
In Railway v. Hinds, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 14, a passenger's
arm was broken in a fight between some drunken persons that
forced their way into the car at a station near an agricultural
fair, and the company was held responsible, because the conductor went on collecting fares, and did not stop the train and
expel the rioters, or demonstrate, by an earnest effort, that it was
impossible to do so.
In Flint v. Transportation Company, 84 Conn. 554, where the
plaintiff was injured by the discharge of a gun dropped by some
soldiers engaged in a scuffle, the court held that passenger carriers
are bound to exercise the utmost vigilance and care to guard those
they transport from violence from whatever source arising; and
the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $10,000.
In Landreaux v. Bell, 5 Louisiana, 0. S. 275, the court say,
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that carriers are responsible for the misconduct of their servants
toward passengers to the same extent as for their misconduct in
regard to merchandise committed to their care; that no satisfactory distinction can be drawn between the two cases.
In Chamberlain'v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242, Judge STORY declared in language strong and emphatic, that a passenger's contract entitles him to respectful treatment; and he expressed the
hope that every violation of this right would be visited, in the
shape of damages, with its appropriate punishment.
In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff. 145, where the steward of the ship
assaulted and grossly insulted a female passenger, Judge CLIFFORD
declares, in language equally emphatic, that the contract of all
passengers entitles them to respectful treatment and ptotection
against rudeness and every wanton interference with their persons
from all those in charge of the ship; that the conduct of the
steward disqualified him for his situation, and justified the master
in immediately discharging him, although the vessel was then in
a foreign port. And we have his authority for saying that he has
recently examined the question with care, in a case pending in
the Rhode Island district, where the clerk of a steamboat unjustifiably assaulted and maltreated a passenger, and that he entertains no doubt of the carrier's liability to compensate the passenger for the injury thus received, whether the carrier previously
authorized or subsequently ratified the assault or not. A report
of the case will soon be published. (See 3 Clifford.)
And a recent and well-considered case in Maryland (published
since this case has been pending before the law court, and very
much like it in all respects), fully sustains this view of the law:
_ailroadv. Blocher, 27 Md. 277.
The grounds of the carrier's liability may be briefly stated
thus:The law requires the common carrier of passengers to exercise
the highest degree of care that human judgment and foresight are
capable of, to make his passenger's journey safe. Whoever engages in the business impliedly promises that his passenger shall
have this degree of care. In other words, the carrier is conclusively presumed to have promised to do what, under the circumstances, the law requires him to do. We say conclusively presumed,
for the law will not allow the carrier by notice or special cQntract
even to deprive his passenger of this degree of care. If the
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passenger does not have such care, but on the contrary is unlawfully assaulted and insulted by one of the very persons to whom
his conveyance is intrusted, the carrier's implied promise is broken,
and his legal duty is left unperformed, and he is necessarily
responsible to the passenger for the damages he thereby sustains.
-The passenger's remedy may be either in assumpsit or tort, at his
election. In the one case, he relies upon a breach of the carrier's
common-law duty in support of his action; in the other, upon a
breach of his implied promise. The form of the action is important only upon the question of damages. In actions of assumpsit,
the damages are generally limited to compensation. In actions
of tort, the jury are allowed greater latitude, and in proper cases,
may give exemplary damages.
II. We now come to the second branch of the case. What is
the measure of relief which the law secures to the injured party;
or, in other words, can he recover exemplary damages? We hold
that he can. The right of the jury to give exemplary damages
for injuries wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously inflicted, is as
old as the right of trial by jury itself; and is not, as many seem
to suppose, an innovation upon the rules of the common law. It
was settled in England more than a century ago.
In 1763, Lord Chief Justice PRATT (afterwards Earl of Camden), with whom the other judges concurred, declared that the
jury had done right in giving exemplary damages: .Hckle v.
Aloncy, 2 Wils. 205.
In another case the same learned judge declared with emphasis,
that damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty: Campbell's
Lives of the Chancellors, Am. ed., vol. 5, p. 214.
In 1814, the doctrine of punitive damages was stringently applied in a case where the defendant, in a state of intoxication,
forced himself into the plaintiff's company, and insolently persisted
in hunting upon his grounds. The plaintiff recovered a verdict
for five hundred pounds, the full amount of his ad damnum, and
the court refused to set it aside. Mr. Justice HEATH remarked
in this case that he remembered a case where the jury gave five
hundred pounds for merely knocking a man's hat off, and the court
refused a new trial. It goes, said he, to prevent the practice of
duelling, if juries are permitted to punish insult by exemplary
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damages :."Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442. See also, to the same
effect, Sears v. Lyon, 2 Stark. 317, decided in 1818.
In 1844, Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK said, that in actions for
malicious injuries, juries had always been allowed to give what
are called vindictive damages: Doe v. Filliter,13 M. & W. 50.
In 1858, in an action of trespass for taking personal property
on a fraudulent bill of sale, the defendant's counsel contended
that it was not a case for the application of the doctrine of exemplary damages; but the court held otherwise. No doubt, said
POLtLOCK, 0.B., it was a case in which vindictive damages might
be given: Thomas v. Harris, 3 H. & N. 961.
In 1860, in an action for wilful negligence, the defendant contended that the plaintiff's declaration was too defective to entitle
him to exemplary damages; but the court held otherwise; and
the judge who tried the case remarked that he was glad the court
had come to the conclusion that it was competent for the jury to
give exemplary damages, for he thought the defendant had acted
with a high hand: .Emblenv. jyers, 6 H. & N. 54.
"Damages exemplary," is now a familiar title in the best English law reports. See 6 I. & N. 969.
It was the firmness with which Lord CAMDEN (then Chief Justice PRAI ,) maintained and enforced the right of the jury to
punish with exemplary damages the agents of Lord Halifax (then
Secretary of State) for the illegal arrest of the publishers of the
North Briton, that made him" so immensely popular in England.
Nearly or quite twenty of those cases appear to have been tried
before him, in all of which enormous damages were given, and in
not one of them was the verdict set aside. In one of the cases a
verdict for a thousand pounds was returned for a mere nominal
imprisonment at the house of the officer making the arrest, and
the court refused to set it aside: Beardmore v. Carrington, 2
Wils. 244.
"After this," says.Lord CAMPBELL, in his Lives of the Chancellors,' "he became the idol of the nation. Grim representations
of him laid down the law from sign-posts, many bists and prints
of him were sold not only in the streets of the metropolis, but in
the provincial towns; a fine portrait of him, by Sir Joshua Reynolds, with the flattering inscription, 'in honor of the zealous
asserter of English liberty by law,' was placed in the Guildhall
of the city of London; addresses of thanks to him poured in from
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all quarters; and one of the sights of London, which foreigners
went to see, was the great Lord Chief Justice PRATT."
In this country perhaps Lord CAMDEN is better known as one
of the able English statesmen who so eloquently defended the
American colonies against the unjust claim of the mother country
to tax them. Lord CAMPBELL says some portions of his speeches
upon that subject are still in the mouths of school-boys. Butin
England his immense popularity originated in his firm and vigorous enforcement of the doctrine of exemplary damages. And
we cannot discover that the legality of his rulings in this particular was ever seriously called in question. On the contrary, we
find it admitted by his political opponents that he was a profound
jurist and an able and upright judge. His stringent enforcement
of the right of the jury to punish flagrant wrongs with exemplary
damages, arrested not only great abuses then existing, but it has
had a salutary influence ever since. It won for him the title of
the "asserter of English liberty by law."
In this country the right of the jury to give exemplary damages
has been much discussed. It seems to have been first opposed by
Mr. Theron Metcalf (afterwards reporter and judge of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts), in an article published in 8 American Jurist 887, in 1830. The substance of this article was
afterwards inserted in a note to Mr. Greenleaf's work on Evidence. Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on Damages, took the opposite
view, and sustained his position by the citation of numerous authorities. Professor Greenleaf replied in an article in the Boston
Law Reporter, vol. 9, p. 529. Mr. Sedgwick rejoined in the same
periodical, vol. 10, p. 49. Essays on different sides of the question were also published in 8 American Law Magazine, N. S. 587,
and 4 American Law Magazine, N. S. 61. But notwithstanding
this formidable opposition, the doctrine triumphed, and must be
regarded as now too firmly established to be shaken by anything
short of legislative enactments. In fact the decisions of the courts
are nearly unanimous in its favor.
In a case in the Supreme Court of the Tnited States Mr.
Justice GRIER, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, it
is a well-established principle of the common law that in all
actions for torts the jury may inflict what are called punitive or
exemplary damages, having in view the enormity of the offence
rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. "We
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are aware," the judge continues, "that the propriety of this
doctrine has been questioned by some writers.; but if repeated
judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as
the best exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit
of argument :" Day v. JWoodworth, 13 How. 863.
In a case in North Carolina the court refer to the note in
Professor Greenleaf's work on Evidence, and say that it is very
clearly wrong with respect to the authorities; and in their judgment wrong on principle; that it is fortunate that while juries
endeavor to give ample compensation for the injury actually
received, they are also allowed such full discretion as to make
verdicts to deter others from flagrant violations of social duty.
And the same court hold that the wealth of the defendant is a
proper circumstance to be weighed by the jury, because a thousand
dollars may be a less punishment to one man than a hundred dollars
to another. In one case the same court sustained a verdict which
in terms assessed the actual damages at $100, and the exemplary
damages at $1000. The court held it was a good verdict for
$1100: Pendleton v. -Davis, 1 Jones (N. C.) 98; MeAulay v.
Birkhead, 13 Iredell 28; Gilreath v. Allen, 10 Id. 67.
In fact, Professor Greenleaf is himself an authority for the
doctrine of exemplary damages. Speaking of the action for
assault and battery, he says the jury are not confined to the
mere corporal injury, but may consider the malice of the defendant, the insulting character of his conduct, the rank in life of the
several parties, and all the circumstances of the outrage, and
thereupon award such exemplary damages as the circumstances
may in their judgment require: 2 Greenl. on Ev. § 89.
But if the great weight of Professor Greenleaf's authority were
to be regarded as opposed to the doctrine, we have, on the other
hand, the great weight of Chancellor KENT'S opinion in favor of
it. He says, surely this is the true and salutary doctrine: And
after reviewing the English cases, he continues by saying it cannot
be necessary to multiply instances of its application; that it is
too well settled in practice, and too valuable in principle to be
called in question: Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 64.
This brief review of the doctrine of exemplary damages is not
so much for the purpose of establishing its existence, as to correct
the erroneous impression which some members of the legal profession still seem to entertain, that it is a modern invention, not
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sanctioned by the rules of the common law. We think every
candid-minded person must admit that it is mo new doctrine; that
its existence as a fundamental rule of the common law has been
recognised in England for more than a century; that it has been
there stringently enforced under circumstances which would not
have allowed it to pass unchallenged, if any pretext could have
been found for doubting its validity; and that in this country,
notwithstanding an early and vigorous opposition, it has steadily
progressed, and that th-- decisions of the courts are now nearly
unanimous in its favor. It was sanctioned in this state, after a
careful and full review of the authorities, in -Pike v. JDilling, 48
Mle. 539, and cannot now be regarded as an open question.
But it is said that if the doctrine of exemplary damages must
be regarded as established in suits against natural persons for
their own wilful and malicious torts, it ought not to be applied to
corporations for the torts of their servants, especially where the
tort is committed by a servant of so low a grade as a brakeman
on a railway train, and the tortious act was not directly nor
impliedly authorized nor ratified by the corporation; and several
cases are cited by the defendants' counsel, in which the courts
seem to have taken this view of the law; but we have carefully
examined these cases, and in none of them was there any evidence
that the servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they were simply
cases of mistaken duty; and what these same courts would have
done if a case of such gross and outrageous insult had been before
them, as is now before us, it is impossible to say; and long experience has shown that nothing is more dangerous than to rely
upon the abstract reasoning of courts, when the cases before them
did not call for the application of the doctrines which their
reasoning is intended to establish.
We have given to this objection much consideration, as it was
our duty to do, for the presiding judge declined to instruct the
jury that if the acts and words of the defendants' servant were
not directly nor impliedly authorized nor ratified by the defendants, the plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages. We
confess that it seems to us that there is no class of cases where
the doctrine of exemplary damages can be more beneficially
applied than to railroad corporations in their capacity of common
carriers of passengers; and it might as well not be applied to
them at all as to limit its application to cases where the servant
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is directly or impliedly commanded by the corporation to maltreaz
and insult a passenger, or to cases where such an act is directly
or impliedly ratified; for no such cases will ever occur. A corporation is an imaginary being. It has no mind but the mind of its
servants; it has no voice but the voice of its servants; and it has
no hands with which to act but the hands of its servants. All its
schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes of public enterprise,
are conceived by human minds and executed by human hands;
and these minds and hands are its servants' minds and hands.
All attempt, therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the
servant and the guilt of the corporation; or the malice of the
servant and the malice of the corporation; or the punishment of
the servant and the punishment of the corporation, is sheer nonsense, and only tends to confuse the mind and confound the judgment. Neither guilt, malice, nor suffering is predicable of this
ideal existence called a corporation. And yet under cover of its
name and authority there is in fact as much wickedness, and as
much that is deserving of punishment, as can be found anywhere
else. And since these ideal existences can neither be hung,
imprisoned, whipped, or put in the stocks,-since in fact no corrective influence can be brought to bear upon them except that
of pecuniary loss,-it does seem to us that the doctrine of exemplary damages is more beneficial in its application to them than
in its application to natural persons. If those who are in the
habit of thinking that it is a terrible hardship to punish an innocent corporation for the wickedness of its agents and servants,
will for a moment reflect upon the absurdity of their own thoughts,
their anxiety will be cured. Careful engineers can be selected
who will not run their tiains into open draws; and careful
baggage-men can be secured -who will not handle and smash
trunks and band-boxes as is now the universal custom; and conductors and brakemen can be had who will not assault and insult
passengers; and if the courts will only let the verdicts of upright
and intelligent juries alone, and let the doctrine of exemplary
damages have its legitimate influence, we predict these great and
growing evils will be very much lessened, if not entirely cured.
There is but one vulnerable point about these ideal existences
called corporations; and that is, the pocket of the moneyed power
that is concealed behind them; and if that is reached they will
wince. When it is thoroughly understood that it is not profitable
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to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent
servants, better men will take their places, and not before.
It is our judgment, therefore, that actions against corporations,
for the wilful and malicious acts of their agents and servants in
executing the business of the corporation, should not form exceptions to the rule allowing exemplary damages. On the contrary,
we think this is the very class of cases, of all others, where it will
do the most good, and where it is most needed. And in this
conclusion we are sustained by several of the ablest courts in the
country.
In a case in Mississippi the plaintiff was carried four hundred
yards beyond the station where he had told the conductor he
wished to stop; and he requested the conductor to run the train
back, but the conductor refused, and told the plaintiff to get off
the train or he would carry him to the next station. The plaintiff
got off and walked back, carrying his valise in his hand. The
plaintiff testified that the conductor's manner toward him was
insolent, and the defendants having refused to discharge him, the
jury returned a verdict for $4500, and the court refused to set it
aside. They said the right of the jury to protect the public by
punitive damages, and thus prevent these great public blessings
from being converted into the most dangerous nuisances, was
conclusively settled; and they hoped the verdict would have a
salutary influence upon their future management: Railroad v.
Hurst, 36 Miss. 660.
In New Hampshire, in an action against this identical road,
where, through gross carelessness, there was a collision of the
passenger train with a freight train, ald the plaintiff was thereby
injured, the judge at Nisi Prius instructed the jury that it was a
proper case for exemplary damages; and the full court sustained
the ruling, saying it was a subject in which all the travelling
public were deeply interested; that railroads had practically
monopolized the transportation of passengers on all the principal
lines of travel, and there ought to be no lax administration of the
law in such cases; and that it would be difficult to suggest a case
more loudly calling for an exemplary verdict. [If mere carelessness, however gross, calls loudly for an exemplary verdict, what
shall be said of an injury that is wilful and grossly insulting?]
Hopkins v. At. J. St. Lawrence Railroad, 36 N. Ramp. 9.
Judge REDFIELD, in his very able, and useful work on railways,
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expresses the opinion that there is quite as much necessity for
holding these companies liable to exemplary damages -s their
agents. He says it is difficult to perceive why a passenger, who
suffers indignity and insult from the conductor of a train, should
be cgnlpelled to show an actual ratification of the act, in order to
subject the company to exemplary damages: 2 Redfleld on Railways 231, note. But if such a ratification is necessary, he thinks
the corporation, which is a mere legal entity,- inappreciable to
sense, should be regarded as always present in the person of its
servant, and as directing and ratifying the servant's acts within
the scope of his employment, and thus be made responsible for
his wilful misconduct: 1 Redfleld on Railways 515 et seq.
And in a recent case in Maryland (published since this case has
been pending before the law court), a case in all respects very
similar to the one we are now considering, the presiding judge
was requested to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover vindictive or punitive damages from the
defendants, unless they expressly or impliedly participated in
the tortious act, authorizing it before or approving it after it was
committed; but the presiding justice refused so to instruct the
jury, and the full court held that the request was properly
rejected; that it was settled that where the injury for which
compensation in damages is sought is accompanied by force or
malice, the injured party is entitled to recover exemplary damages:
Railroad v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277.
But the defendants say that the damages awarded by the jury
are excessive, and they move.to have the verdict set aside and a
new trial granted for that reason. That the verdict in this case
is highly punitive, and was so designed by the jury, cannot be
doubted; but by whose judgment is it to be measured to determine whether or not it is excessive? What standard shall be
used? It is a case of wanton insult and injury to the plaintiff's
character and feelings of self-respect, and the damages can be
measured by no property standard. It is a case where the judgment will be very much influenced by the estimation in which
character, self-respect, and freedom from insult are held. To
those who set a very low value on character, and think that pride
and self-respect exist only to become objects of ridicule and sport,
the damages will undoubtedly be considered excessive. It would
not be strange if some such persons, meas.uring the sensibilities
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of others by their own low standard, should view this verdict with
envy, and regret that somebody will not assault and insult them,
if such is to be the standard of compensation. While others who
feel that character and self-respect are above all price, more
valuable than life itself even, will regard the verdict as none too
large. We repeat, therefore, that it is a case where men's judgments will be likely to differ. And suppose the court is of opinion
that the damages in this case are greater, much greater even,
than they would have awarded, does it therefore follow that the
judgment of the court is to be substituted for that of the jury?
By no means. It is the wisdom of the law to suppose that the
judgment of the jury is more likely to be right than the judgment
of the court, for it is to the former and not to the latter that the
duty of estimating damages is confided. Unless the damages are
so large as to satisfy the court that the verdict was not the result
of an honest exercise of judgment, they have no right to set it
aside.
A careful examination of the case fails to satisfy us thlat the
jury acted dishonestly, or that they made any mistake in their
application of the doctrine of exemplary damages. We have no
doubt that the highly punitive character of their verdict is owing
to the fact that, after Jackson's misconduct was known to the
defendants, they still retained him in their service. The jury
undoubtedly felt that it was due to the plaintiff, and due to every
other traveller upon that road, to have him instantly discharged;
and that to retain him in his place, and thus shield and protect
him against the protestation of the plaintiff, made to the servant
himself at the time of the assault, that he would lose his place,
was a practical ratification and approval of the servant's conduct,
and would be so understood by him and by every other servant
on the road.
And when we consider the violent, long-continued, and grossly
insulting character of the assault; that it was made upon a person
in feeble health, and was accompanied by language so coarse,
profane, and brutal; that so far as appears it was wholly .unprovoked; we confess we are amazed at the conduct of the defendants
in not instantly discharging Jackson. Thus to shield and protect
him in his insolence, deeply implicated them in his guilt. It was
such indifference to the treatment the plaintiff had received, such
indifference to the treatment that other travellers might receive,
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such indifference to the evil influence which such an example
would have upon the servants of this and other lines of public
travel, that we are not prepared to say the jury acted unwisely
in making their verdict highly punitive. We cannot help feeling
that if we should interfere and set it aside, our action would be
most unfortunate and detrimental to the public interests. On the
contrary, if we allow it to stand, we cannot doubt that its influence will be salutary. It will be an impressive lesson to these
defendants, and to the managers of other lines of public travel,
of the risk they incur when they retain in their service servants
known to be reckless, ill-mannered, and unfit for their places.
And it will encourage those who may suffer insult and violence at
the hands of such servants, not to retaliate or attempt to become
their own avengers, as is too often done, but to trust to the law
and to the courts of justice, for the redress of their grievances.
It will say to them, be patient and law-abiding, and your redress
shall surely come, and in such measure as will not add insult to
your previous injury.
On the whole, we cannot doubt that it is best for all concerned
that this verdict be allowed to stand.
The foregoing case is one of marked
interest, on account of the very unusual
misconduct and abuse of the plaintiff by
the defendants' servant. We conjecture
that no similar case of misconduct on
the part of the conductor of a first class
passenger train will be likely to occur
here ; and for the credit of the country,
we trust it will not be regarded as presumptuous that we should predict, that
no such case will ever again occur in
our.country. But as cases must be constantly liable to arise where the same
principle as to the rule of damages will
be raised, we have great satisfaction in
being able to present our readers with
what we regard as a very thorough and
satisfactory exposition of the law of the
question.
We should scarcely expect to be able
to afford much aid toward solving the
question, in addition to what we have
already attempted in anotherplace, reVOL. XIX.-3

ferred to in the opinion of Mr. Justice
WALTON.
It is scarcely possible to conceive that any jury, or court, would ever
be able to fix upon any rule of damages
in actions for torts, and especially for
personal injury of an aggravated and insulting character, without having more
or less reference to the circumstances attending the transaction. There is a degree of pain and suffering, to a person
of delicacy and sensitive feelings, where
an injury is wantonly and brutally inflicted, which it is impossible to separate
from the injury itself; which is, indeed,
a part of it, and the principal part, and
which thus renders it indispensable to
measure the compensation awarded by
way of damages largely by it, in order
to meet, in any just sense, the real merits of the case. We believe that the
most plausible argument against giving
damages, by way of example, or punishment, has arisen more from the terms
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used in expressing such claims, than
from any innate infirmity in the claim
for having damages awarded, in such
cases, somewhat beyond the mere pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff.
It is quite conceivable that a man might,
by way of simple assault and insult, suffer so severely as to have it become the
proximate cause of death, even where
his person or property was not really deteriorated one cent. From this extreme
supposed case, there will be found a
regular gradation till we come into the
class of torts altogether unintentional,
such as come from mistake, or accident,
or forgetfulness, or negligence. And
in all these cases the primary basis of
awarding damages unquestionably is the
actual wrong and injury perpetrated by
the defendant upon the plaintiff. The
manner and motive of the defendant are
essential media of measuring the wrong
and injury to the plaintiff. It is impossible to measure the plaintiff's damage
except through such media. The same
thing done in one manner, and from one
motive, is indifferent to us, so that we
almost forget it in an hour; and when
done differently, in these respects, becomes absolutely intolerable, so that no
amount of money is any compensation
whatever, and we never can forget and
scarcely forgive it to our dying day.
So that juries, in giving damages entirely beyond the actual pecuniary detriment to the plaintiff, will not be required
to have any reference to meting out
punishment to the defendant, or making
the case an example to others. But, no
doubt, even these considerations will
more or less enter into verdicts upon
cases of wanton and unprovoked injuries.
The verdict, in such cases, as matter of
the simplest justice, should solve all
doubtful questions against the party
solely in the wrong. There will always
be considerations connected with the
remedy for personal wrongs by suit in
court, which, if divided equally between

the parties, must render merely compensatory damages for the personal injury
wholly inadequate as a redress. The
expense of counsel fees, which it is well
settled cannot be included in the verdict,
and of personal attention to the suit,
and mental anxiety in regard to it, are
generally far beyond the mere pecuniary
damage to the person. And these, although not proper elements of the verdict, ought not to be wholly overlooked.
All that is really meant, then, by
exemplary or punitive damages is, that
such ample and adequate redress shall be
awarded the plaintiff as to admonish all
others, tempted to commit similar outrages upon the rights of others, that it
will prove an expensive experiment, and
probably be attended with suqh incidental
punishment as to deter all prudent men
from its undertaking. The effect of verdicts in such cases should be to deter offenders from repeating their offences,
and to encourage the injured party to
seek redress in that form.
There is no fair question that damages cannot properly be awarded one
man, solely upon the ground of punishing another, or of making a public example of his case.
But every man
should obtain such redress in courts as
will not tend to discourage resort to such
remedy.
Whenever the verdicts of
juries in cases of this character are so
far reduced as to become an insult instead of a cure for the wrong, the people
will take the matter into their own hands,
and the injured party and his friends
will seek redress in the court of Judge
Lynch.
The administration of the law in the
regularly constituted tribunals of the
country should be so conducted as " to
become a terror to the evil-doer, and a
praise to them that do well."
And this
cannot be accomplished, in cases of this
character, by merely nominal verdicts,
or those that give only the pecuniary
loss sustained by the plaintiff, which is
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nothing more than dividing the expenses
of the suit between the parties.
The following notes upon some recent decisions upon the point may be
of some interest to the profession, although they do not, we confess, throw
much light upon the points in dispute.
In Louisville and Portland Railroad
Co. v. Smith, 2 Duvall 556, a horse-car
was upset and thrown down an embankment, whereby the plaintiff, a passenger,
was severely cut and bruised, and permanently disabled. There was evidence
that fast driving was the primary cause
of the accident. Held, that it was error
to instruct the jury that they might, in
their discretion, award exemplary damages. It seems to us, if there was evident misconduct on the part of the driver,
it was the act of the company, and the
jury should have given exemplary damages, such as would be likely to make
other companies watchful in employing
sober and prudent drivers, and such as
would fully compensate the plaintiff for
all damages, direct and incidental.
In Southern Railroad Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374, it was held that a
neglect of duty, clearly not attended
with any circumstances of insult, or aggravation of feelings, or injury to the
person or his property, or of bodily or
mental suffering, would not justify vindictive damages ; yet if there be any
evidence tending to show such circumstances, its weight and force rest with
the jury, whose verdict in awarding
damages for such wrong will not be disturbed. And the court held as error a
charge that "any failure to discharge
all the duties imposed by the nature of
the office of common carrier amounts to
gross and wilful misconduct, for which
punitive damages maybe given." There
could be no question of the entire soundness of this decision, inasmuch as the default might have, and probably did occur
without any intentional wrong.
In an action by a passenger against a

railroad company to recover damages,
on account of the company's agent having conveyed the plaintiff to a point beyond the place of his destination, and
then compelling him to leave the cars,
the jury are authorized to allow not only
just compensation for the injury, but to
inflict proper punishment on the defendants for their disregard of public duty ;
and in such case they may take into consideration the pecuniary circumstances
of the defendant company: New Orleans,
d-c., Railroadv. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660.
The decision in this case is certainly
expressed in most unfortunate language.
The plaintiff was certainly entitled to be
fully indemnified against all loss, direct
and incidental, and it was proper for the
jury to award such damages as might
operate to correct the indifference of
railway employees in such cases, and to
make the company more watchful in selecting their agents. But '" punishment"
is certainly no function of a jury in
civil cases, and what the pecuniary condition of the defendant has to do with
the verdict in such a case is more than
we can conjecture. The company is
bound to pay the sum awarded, and if
rich it is fortunate for both parties, and
if very poor, it might prove unfortunate
for both.
In Helrn v. M3cCaughn, 32 Miss. I, an
action against a common carrier, a violation of general duty to the public was
regarded as sufficient to determine the
character of the action as one founded
in tort and not in contract, and to authorize the jury to award exemplary damages.
In this case a steamboat company had
advertised to stop at a certain place, on
certain days, for freight and passengers.
The plaintiff, acting upon this notice,
went with his wife to the appointed place
at the time designated, and there waited
for the boat until daybreak next morning, but the boat did not come, whereby
the trip was lost to the plaintiff's wife,
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who was detained there for several days
thereafter. It was necessary for the
parties to remain on the wharf, watching
for the boat during the night, in order to
get passage, and the wharf was a most
inclement place at that time; the night
being unusually cold, and the situation
hard for the plaintiff's wife, from which
she suffered pain and incurred injury.
The jury on these facts awarded exemplary damages, and the Supreme Court
This decision
sustained the verdict.
seems to have been substantially correct.
A verdict awarding damages to the ex-

tent of what the plaintiff or his wife
might have earned in the time would
surely be nothing less than an insult.
In an action for damages by a passenger on a steamboat against the owner
of the boat for injuries received by the
explosion of a boiler, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for his bodily pain and
suffering: Swarthout v. Te New JTersey
Steamboat Company, 46 Barb. 222.
There can be no doubt of the correctness
of the rule here laid down. The courts
all agree in this.
I. F. R.
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IN RE YORK & HOOVER, BANKRUPTS.
The general rule in the computation of time within which an act is to be done
is to exclude the first day and include the last.
This is the rule prescribed by the Bankrupt Act, unless the last day happens to
fall on Sunday, in which case that day is excluded also. In all other cases Sundays are counted as other days.
A proceeding in bankruptcy from the filing of the petition to the discharge or
refusal to discharge the bankrupt is a single case, and is subject to appeal or writ
of error as such, but there may be a large number of cases or questions arising in
the course of it, and these may be the subject of review by the Circuit Court by
writ of error or appeal or petition to review, according to their nature.
If the matter is a suit at law or in equity, or a dispute by the assignee of a
creditor's claim allowed, or a claim by a creditor wholly or in part rejected, then
it must be brought before the Circuit Court by writ of error or appeal.
But all other cases or questions arising in the progress of a case in bankruptcy
fall within the supervisory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and must be brought
before it by bill or petition to review.
The settlement of the status of a creditor's claim as to priority with respect to
other liens is not the allowance or rejection of the claim meant by sect. 8, by which
an appeal is given, and the proper mode of bringing such a matter before the
Circuit Court is by petition to review.
An assignee made a sale of real estate of the bankrupt at which certain creditors
purchased. The District Court confirmed the sale against the exceptions of other
creditors, and made an order as to the priority of certain liens. .eld, that this
was a proceeding within the supervisory power of the Circuit Court, and should
be brought before it by petition to review.
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TIS was a petition of review of certain proceedings in bankruptcy in the District Court of Louisiana. Ober, Atwater & Co.
claimed first mortgages on two plantations surrendered by the
bankrupts, York & Hoover. They obtained an order for the sale
of them, and purchased both at the assignee's sale. They applied
for a rule to confirm the sale, and asked that the proceeds of sale
be applied to the extinguishment of their mortgages. TheCitizens' Bank and other creditors answered the rule, and alleged
that the mortgage of Ober, Atwater & Co. on one of the plantations, had been extinguished, and on the other it was only second
in rank. They further alleged that Ober, Atwater & Co. had
influenced a comlietitor not to bid for one of the plantations, and
had also made overtures to the solicitor of the assignee, calculated
to give them an unjust preference over other creditors with
respect to both. The District Court made the rule absolute, and
the Citizens' Bank appealed, and also joined the other creditors
in a petition of review to the Circuit Court.
Hyams & Jones, and Blandolph, Singleton & Browne, for appellants, cited Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb. 117; Snyder v. Warren, 2
Cowen 518; 6 Id. 605; Broom's Legal Mlaxims 22; JVathen v.
Beaumont, 11 East 271; Story v. .Elliott, 8 Cowen 28; McGill
v. The Bank of U. S., 12 Wheat. 511; 2 Hill 875; L.ong v.
Hughes, 1 Duvall (Ky. Rep.) 887; Fowler v. Smith, 1 Rob. 448;
Jones v. Boyle, 14 La. 268; Gorham v. D)e Armas, 7 TMartin
859; State v. Boyle, 9 La. Ann. 871.
B. & HT Marr, for appellees.
WooDs, J.-York and Hoover having been declared bankrupts
by the adjudication of the District Court, E. E. Norton, their
assignee, by H. D. Stone, his solicitor, filed a petition in said
District Co'rt, sitting as a Court of Bankruptcy, praying for an
order to sell two plantations, the property of bankrupts. An
order of sale was obtained, and under it a sale of the plantations,
called respectively "White Hall" and "Home," was made on the
16th February 1869, and Ober, one of the creditors, became the
purchaser thereof. On the - day of February 1869 C. H. Slocomb,
one of the creditors of York & Hoover, filed his petition in the
District Court, setting forth the fact of the sale to Ober, that no
deed had, at the time of filing his potition, been made by Norton,
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the assigne, to Ober, charging that the sale was fraudulent, and
therefore illegal and void, and praying, on behalf of himself and
other creditors of York & Hoover, that Ober, Norton, the
assignee, and others, show cause why the sale should not be set
aside.
According to the prayer of this petition, an order was made as
prayed for, and the parties named were cited to show cause why
the prayer of the petition should not be granted.
The minutes of the District Court of the date of March 19th
1869 show the following entry: No. 603. Matter of York &
Hoover. On motion of H. D. Stone, attorney of E. E. Norton,
and upon showing to the court that a sale was made of two plantations surrendered herein, namely, the "Home" and "White
Hall" plantations, situated in the parish of Concordia (here follows a description of the two plantations), on the 16th of February
1869, and upon further showing to the court that the followingnamed parties appear to have had mortgages, privileges, claims,
and liens upon said plantations (here follow the names of some
fifty creditors), it is ordered that the parties above named, and
the bankrupts, and all persons interested herein, show cause, on
the 1st day of May 1869, at 11 o'clock A. m., why said sale should
not be confirmed, and at the same time the priority and rank of
said mortgages, privileges, liens, and claims be fixed and adjudicated; that, as so adjudicated, the same be directed to be paid;
that notice thereof be given by publication in the New Orleans
Republican for three days, the last publication to be at least ten
days before such hearing.
After this order to show cause was made by the court, but precisely when, we are unable to ascertain from the papers submitted
to us, the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, and a large number of
other creditors of York & Hoover, filed an exception to the
rule, in which they set out various grounds why the sale should
not be confirmed, and conclude by praying that the application
of the assignee for the confirmation of the sale be refused and
rejected, and that said sale be set aside and annulled.
On the day fixed for the hearing of the rule, the matter of the
rule and exception thereto were referred by the District Court,
sitting in bankruptcy, to a commissioner to ascertain and report
upon the validity of the sale and the priority of the claims; and
subsequently said commissioraer reported that there was no fraud
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or collusion in making the sale, and that certain mortgages held
by Ober, Atwater & Co. on said White Hall and Home plantations were the first and best liens on those places respectively,
and that the amount due on them was more than the proceeds
of the sale.
Thereupon it was ordered by the court, on motion, that the
report of the commissioner, if not opposed within three days, be
approved and homologaied.
Exceptions were filed to the report of the commissioner, and
afterwards, to wit, on 11th January 1870, the District Court confirmed the sale, but reserved the question of priority of mortgages
argument.
and liens for further
On the 31st of March 1870,.the District Court declared that
the mortgages of Ober, Atwater & Co. were the first lien on said
plantations and on the proceeds of the sale thereof, and directed
them to be paid in preference to any of the other mortgages set
up in the opposition of the creditors of York & Hoover, and
directed the money arising from the sale to be paid to Ober, Atwater & Co.
On the 5th of April 1870, an application was made for a rehearing on the matters embraced in the decision of the court, and
on the 27th of April a rehearing was refused.
The Citizens' Bank and other creditors of York & Hoover, on
the 9th of May, took an appeal from the order of the court of
March 31st, which in effect dated from the refusal for rehearing
on the 27th of April. And on the said 9th of May said Citizens'
Bank and other creditors filed in this court a petition, invoking
the supervisory jurisdiction of this court, under the 2d section
of the Bankrupt Act, and praying that the orders and decrees
of the District Court above recited be set aside, the sale of said
plantations declared null and void, and the same ordered to be
resold, and that their mortgages be decreed to have priority.
Thecase has been heard upon two questions:1. Whether the appeal was taken within the time limited by
law; and,
2. Whether the case presented by the petition of the Citizens'
Bank and others was a case for the supervisory jurisdiction of
the court, and whether the court has jurisdiction thereof.
1. As intimated during the argument, we are of opinion, that if
this were a proper case for appeal,.the appeal was taken too late;
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if Sundays ire counted, the delay of ten days allowed for the
appeal had expired before the appeal was taken: unless Sundays
are expressly excepted in the statute, they are to be counted; the
language of the 8th section of the Bankrupt Act is, "no appeal
shall be allowed from the District to the Circuit Court, unless it
,is claimed and notice thereof given to the clerk, &c., &c., within
ten days after the entry of the decree or decision appealed from."
The rule for computing the number of* days within which an
appeal is allowed, is expressly declared by the 48th section of the
Bankrupt Act, as follows: "In all cases in which any particular
number of days is prescribed by this act, &c., &c., for the doing
of any act, the same shall be reckoned in the absence of any
expression to the contrary, exclusive of the first and inclusive
of the last day, unless the last day shall fall on Sunday, in which
case the time shall be reckoned exclusive of that day also." The
fair and, as it seems to us, unavoidable inference is, that where
Sunday is not the last day, it is not to be excluded. Applying
this rule, and excluding the 27th of April, the day on which the
decision was signed, the delay for appeal in this case expired with
the 7th of May; the appeal not having been taken till the 9th, it
was two days too late.
2. The other question presented is, whether this is a proper
case for the supervisory jurisdiction of the court.
By the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act it is provided that the
Circuit Courts, in the districts where proceedings in bankruptcy
are pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under this act; and, except
where special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition,
or other proper process of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as a court of equity.
"The only construction which gives due effect to all parts of
this section is that which, on the one hand, excludes from the
category of general superintendence and jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court, the appellate jurisdiction defined by the 8th section; and
on the other, brings within that category all decisions of the
District Court or district judge at Chambers, which cannot be
reviewed upon appeal or writ of error under the provisions of that
section :" CHASE, C. J., In re Alexander, 8 Am. Law Reg. 423.
By the 8th section of the act it is provided that appeals may be
taken from the District to the Circuit Courts in all cases in equity,
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and writs of error may be allowed to the said Circuit Courts from
said District Courts, in oases at law under the jurisdiction
created by the Bankrupt Act, when the debt or damages claimed
amount to more than $500; and any supposed creditor whose
claim is wholly or in part rejected, or an assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim, may appeal. Now, according
to the decision of Chief Justice CHAsE, just quoted, unless this
case falls under one of the classes provided for in this section, it
is a proper case for the supervisory jurisdiction of the court.
1. It is not the case of an assignee who is dissatisfied with the
allowance of a claim.
2. It is not the case of a supposed creditor, whose claim has
been wholly or in part rejected. The claims of these petitioning
creditors, so far as the record shows, have all been allowed in
full. It is true, the court has decided that their claims are not
entitled to priority, and that other creditors are, but this is not a
rejection of their claims. A creditor's claim is the debt due from
the bankrupt to him, and the question of priority of payment is
one totally distinct from the claim or debt. We think this is
clear from the 1st section of the act which extends the jurisdiction of the court a. to all cases and controversies between the
bankrupt and any creditor who shall claim any debt or demand
under the bankruptcy; b. the collection of the assets; c. the
ascertainment and liquidation of liens, &c.; d. the adjustment
of the various priorities and conflicting interests of all parties.
Here is an evident distinction made between the claim of a
debt or demand against the bankrupt and priority as to other
creditors. A claim of priority is not a claim asserted against
the bankrupt, but a right asserted against other creditors.
8. That the matter decided by the District Court on March
31st is n6t a case at law in which a writ of error would lie; this
is clear and is not disputed.
4. It remains then to consider whether it was a case in equity
in which an appeal might be taken. The phrase case in equity,
in the 8th section, in our view, means a suit in equity.
It would seem hardly necessary to cite authority to show what
a case or suit in equity is. Blackstone says: "The first commencement of a suit in chancery is by preferring a bill to the
Lord Chancellor, in the style of a petition, humbly complaining,
showeth to your lordship, your orator," &c. This is in the nature
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of a declaration at common law, or a libel and allegation in the
spiritual courts, setting forth the circumstances of the case at
length, and for that your orator is wholly without remedy at the
common law; relief is therefore prayed at the chancellor's hands,
and also process of subpoena against the defendant to compel him
to answer, under oath, all the matter charged in the bill. The
bill must call all the necessary parties, however remotely concerned in interest, before the court-must be signed by counsel.
The 7th Equity Rule, as prescribed by the Supreme Court of
the United States, provides that the process by subpoena shall constitute the proper mesne process in all suits in equity to require
the defendant to appear and answer the exigency of the bill.
Rule 12 provides that whenever a bill is filed the clerk shall issue
process of subpcena thereon, which shall be returnable into the
clerk's office the next rule-day, or the next rule-day but one at
the election of the plaintiff, occurring after twenty days from the
issuing thereof.
It is further provided in the equity rules that the appearanceday shall be the rule-day to which the subpoena is made returnable, provided the defendant has been served with process twenty
days before that day; otherwise his appearance-day shall be the
next rule-day succeeding the rule-day when the process is returnable. And it is made the duty of defendant to file his plea,
answer, or demurrer to the bill on the rule-day next succeeding
his appearance. From what has preceded, it will be seen what isa case in equity, how it is instituted, and how the parties are
brought into court, and when they are required to answer.
If we decide that the case before the court is not one for its
revisory jurisdiction, we in effect decide that the matter which
was passed on by the District Court on March 31st, was a case
in equity. In other words, that a mere motion entered on the
minutes of the court, not verified by affidavit, without a prayer
for relief, without a prayer for process, is a bill in equity; that a
notice published three times in a newspaper is service of process,
and brings parties into court as if served with a subpoena in
chancery, and that a decree rendered upon such rule, where only
a portion of the parties referred to in the rule make any appearance whatever, where only a part of them file any response to the
motion, and that in the way of an exception and not sworn to,
where no decrees pro confesso are taken against those who do not
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appear, is a final decree in a case in equity, from which, under
the Judiciary Act, an appeal lies to the Circuit Court; the mere
statement of the proposition is its own refutation. Nor do we
think the case made by the petition of Slocomb, even if it was
held to give character to the proceeding and decision which
petitioning creditors seek to review, -is any more of a case in
equity than the motion of the assignee Norton by his solicitor.
Stone. There is scarcely anything in the petition which assimilates it to a bill in equity. It is in fact nothing more than a
motion in writing. It simply prays that said Ober, the said
assignee, and said -Girardy & Co., show cause on a certain day
why the said sales should not be set aside as void, and until the
hearing, that the parties named be enjoined from taking any steps
towards perfecting said sales. Only three or four of the persons
interested in the question are named in the petition-the great
mass of them are left out entirely: no prayer of process, no demand for answers under oath, no service of process, and in fact
scarcely any of the common incidents of a bill in equity are to
be found in the petition. To call it a bill in equity, or the proceeding a case in equity, it seems to us, is an entire misapprehensi.n of the meaning of the term.
But it is insisted that the setting aside a sale for fraud, and
determining the priorities of liens, are matters of purely equitable
cognisance, and, therefore, the proceeding sought to be reviewed
is a case in equity from which appeal lies.
Courts of law frequently pass upon questions purely equitable,
on motion or rule, but the nature of the question has never been
held to make such motion or rule a case in equity. It is a very
common practice for courts, on motion, to set aside sales made by
a sheriff on execution, on account of some fraud or unfairness on
the part of the sheriff or purchaser; yet, he would be a bold man
who would insist that such a motion was a case in equity. When
money is brought into court, the proceeds of a sale on execution,
courts of law do not hesitate, on motion, to 'direct how the money
shall be distributed, assuming to pass upon the priorities of claimants to the fund; yet it has never been supposed that by so doing
they were rendering a decree in chancery, or that the motion to
distribute the fund according to the rights of the parties made a
case in equity. These two things-passing upon the validity of a
sale, and directing the distribution of the fund arising therefrom,
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on motion or rule to show cause-are precisely what the District
Court did, and we do not think the motion was a case in equity,
or the ruling of the court a decree in equity. It was the simple
exercise of a power incident to courts of law, as well as of equity,
to regulate the proceedings in a case pending before them, to
regulate their own process and to distribute funds brought into
court.
Our general view of the whole subject is this: The proceeding
in bankruptcy, from the filing of the petition to the discharge of
the bankrupt, and the final dividend, is a single statutory case or
proceeding. In the conduct of the case a large number of questions may arise. Before the assets of the bankrupt can be collected and distributed, it will frequently occur that the assignee
or the creditor is driven to a regular bill in equity, or an action
at law. In these cases, the Circuit Court has no supervisory jurisdiction. Nor has it where the claim of a supposed creditor has
been rejected in whole or in part, or where the assignee is dissatisfied -with the allowance of a claim. These classes of cases
may be taken up on writ of error or appeal. But all other cases
and questions arising in the progress of a case of bankruptcy
through the Bankrupt Court, whether the matter is of legal or
equitable cognisance, and where the matter is not the subject of a
regular suit at equity or at law, or is not the allowance or disallowance of a claim, fall within the supervising jurisdiction of the
court, and may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any
party aggrieved, be heard and determined in the Circuit Court as
a court of equity.
We think the exceptions to the petition of review in this case
not well taken; they are therefore overruled.
The appeal, we think, is not well taken, both because not taken
in time and -because the matter decided was not the subject of
appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
BRADLEY, J.,

concurred.

The decision appealed from in the
foregoing case was rendered in open
court, and was entered on the minutes
on the 26th April, and it was copied into
the opinion and judgment docket, and
signed by the judge, on the 27th April.
The appeal was taken on the 9th of May,

and the motion to dismiss was on the
ground that the Circuit Court had no
jurisdiction of an appeal not taken within
ten days after the entry of the decision
appealed from.
The appellant contended that the delay for an appeal must be counted from
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the date of the signing by the judge:
that it was the intention of Congress to
allow ten juridical days; that Sunday,
the 1st of May, must be omitted, as
dies non juridicus;and that Sunday, the
8th of May, being the tenth day, was also
to be excluded by the express terms of
section 48 of the Bankrupt Act.
Now, it is evident that, if Sunday is
to be excluded, at any part of the term,
simply because it is dies non juridicus, it
must be excluded at every part of the
term for the same reason. If it must
be excluded when it is gin intermediate
day, the fourth day of the term, as in
this case, because it is dies non juridicus,
it must be excluded at the end of OPa
term, when it happens to be the tenth
day numerically. So that, upon the
hypothesis of the appellant, Sunday
never can be the terminal day.
By section 48 of the Bankrupt Act,
Sunday, and certain other days of publip rest, are to be excluded, when the
last of any prescribed number of days,
happens to fall pa such flay pf rest.
Congress, therefore, contemplated and
provided for a contingency in which the
last day might fall on such day of rest;
a contingency which wotpld be cimply,
impossible if such day is to be excluded
in any part of the term as dies non juridicus, not a day, in legal contemplation,
and, therefore, not to be counted as one
of the prescribed number of days. As
the Congress thought it necessaryto exclude, by the express provision of seetion 48, Sunday and certain other days
of public rest, in the single exceptional
ease when the last day of the prescribed
term falls on Sunday, &q., this is a clear
expression of the legislative nderstanding and.will, that Sundays and other
days of public rest not being terminal
days, are to be counted as any other
days.
It must be presumed that -Congress
was not ignorant of the existing law,

and knew that it was not necessary to
declare, as is done byway of inducement in section 48 of the Bankrupt
Act, that the computation of any number of days prescribed by the act shall
be exclusive of the first and inclusive
of the last day; because jurisprudence,
state and national, had, long before,
fixed that as the rule, in accordance
with the Roman law, the law of Spain,
of France, and of England: 4 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 222; 4 Washington
C. C. 240; 1Pick. 485; 3 N. I. 93;
4 N. H. 268; 2 Wallace 190.
The thing which it was necessary for
the Congress to do, as it intended to follow jurisprudence in every other reppeet, in the computation of any prescribed number of days, the thing which
was in the mind of the law-making
power, was to fix the rule of computation
when the last day of the term should
happen to fall on Sunday, or the Fourth
of JTuly, or Christmas, or any day appointed by the President pf the United
States as a day of ppllic fast pr thanksgiving:, and the declaration that the
computation shall be exclusive of the
first, and inulusive of the last day, a
rule already perfectly understood and
well p§tablished, about wluipb there was
no question, is mprely the recognition
and announcement of that rule, and inwhich the
ducement to the 'rRuL,
Congrpss had in view, intended to adopt,
and did adopt, exceptionally, by section
48, that when the last day falls on Suliday, &c., the time shall be reckoned exclusive of that day also. This rule is a
departure from the general rule, establishe'd byjurisprudenpp, then and now
existing; and is copied almost literally
from the English rule of practice,
adopted at Hilary Term, 2 William IV.
*Without this latter clause of section
48, the computation would have been
exclusive of the first day, the dies aquo,
and inclusive of the last day, the dies ad
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quem, without respect to the day of the
week, or month, or year, on which the
)ast day might happen to fall.
Jurisprudence, state and national, had
established the general rule, that when
a term is fixed, either by statute or by
contract, within which something is to
be done, and no provision is made,
either by the statute or the contract, expressly excluding any day, the days of
the term are to be taken consecutively,
reckoned numerically; and, if the last
day falls on Sunday, the thing cannot
be done on the following Monday.
In Pierpontv. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C.
240, this rule was applied to a contract.
An assignment had been made for the
benefit of creditors, one of the conditions of which was that they should release the debtors within sixty days after
the date of the assignment. The sixtieth day was Sunday; and Justice
WASHINGTON, citing I Lord Raymond,
2 Rolle's Abridgment, and other English authorities, in support of his opinion, decided that the release executed on
the following Monday was not in time.
By statute of Massachusetts, the lien
formed by attachment on mesne process
was limited to thirty days after the rendering of the judgment. The thirtieth
day was Sunday, and the execution necessary to continue the lien was issued
on the following Monday. The court
said: " It is not for this court to extend
the term ; nor do we see any reason why
the last day of the thirty should be excluded because it happens to be Sunday,
rather than any or all the Sundays during the time limited:" 15 Mlass. 226.
A statute of Pennsylvania allowed an
appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
to the Supreme Court, within twenty days
after the rendering of the decision.
The decision was rendered on the 12th
April; the 18th and 25th were Sundays,
and were included. The last day, numerically, was Sunday, the 2d of May;

and the appeal taken on Monday, the
3d May, was maintained, the court deciding that the intermediate Sundays
were to be included, and the terminal
Sunday to be excluded: Goswiler's Estate, 3 Penna. 201.
In New York, where an appeal was
to be taken within ten days, the tenth
day was Sunday, and the appeal was
taken on Monday, the court said:"When a statute declares an act shall
be done within a certain number of days,
Sunday must be computed as one, though
it happens to be the last; and, in such
a case, performance on Monday following will not be a compliance with the
statute. Sunday has in no case been
excluded in the computation of statute
time:" 7 Cowen 147.
So, in King v. Dowdall, 2 Sandford,
S. C. 132, where there was a delay of five
days for an appeal from the decision of a
justice, and Sunday intervened, the court
said: "We know of no principle by
which Sunday is to be excluded from the
computation, when it is an intermediate day."
In Texas, the last day for filing an
appeal bond was Sunday. The bond
was filed on the following Monday.
The court, dismissing the appeal, said:
'+Although courts, in construing their
own rules, exclude Sundays, in construing a statute they do not, though it
should he the last day:" 6 Texas 83.
See also 12 Iowa 186; 9 Indiana;
and 7 Rhode Island, cases to the same
effect.
In Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & Johnson 268, the last day for the performance
of a contract was Sunday; the court held
that the delay expired on the preceding
Saturday.
See the Rule stated in the same terms:
Story on Contracts, 971, p. 1072.
In Salter v. Burt, 20 Wendell 207,
BuoNsox, J., said, " In computing the
time mentioned in a contract for the do-
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ing of an act, intervening Sundays are
to be counted; but when the day of performance falls on Sunday, it is not to be
taken into the computation.
See also 2 Hill 375, and notes; Same
587; Story on Bills, 338.
Parsons, Contracts, vol. 2, p. 666,
lays down the rule thus: " If a contract
is to be performed, or some act done, in
a certain number of days, and Sunday
happens to come between the first and
last day, it must be counted as one
day,, unless the contrary be clearly expressed." See 8 Q. B; 380.
In Bateman v. .fcGowan, I Metealfe
(Ky.) 548, notice of contest of election
must be given within ten days. The
delay began on the 6th, and notice given
on the 16th was held too late. So, the
intervening Sunday was counted as one
day.
"cIn computing the time of notices
and Rules in Practice, intermediate Sundays are included and counted with ordinary week-days; but where the last
day falls on Sunday, it is excluded, and
the party has the whole of the following
Monday:" 3 Chitty's General Practice
702. See also a case to the same effect in
11 East 271, which was a four days' rule
to show cause, &c.
In State v. Boyle, 9 La. Annl. 371,
the statute required, in capital cases,
that a copy of the indictment and list
of the jury should be served on the
accused, at least two entire days before
the trial. The service was on Friday,
23d April; and the trial was on Monday, 26th April. The court said the
object of this statute was to enable the
accused to confer with his counsel, and
to have his witnesses summoned, which
he could not do if Sunday was counted
as one of the two days; and, in this
special case, it was held that the two
days must be juridical days.
By Statute 20 & 21 Victoria, Ch. 43,
2, a delay of three days is allowed, in
certain summary cases, within which the

party dissatisfied with the decision, as
being erroneous in point of law, may
apply to the justice to state the case for
review in the Court of Common Pleas.
The third day was Sunday; and the
application was on Monday following.
The court said:"The statute giving three days, and
saying nothing about Sunday being exelided, as in some of the Rules of Court,
it must be reckoned as one of the three
days. The appellee ought to have applied on Saturday." And BYLEs, J.,
added: " Sunday at common law is like
any other day :" 93 Eng. C. L. 265.
By the Louisiana Code of Practice,
art. 318, Sunday is to be counted as any
other day, except where it is expressly
excluded. It is expressly excluded in
the delay allowed for an appeal from
the District Courts to the Supreme Court.
It is not expressly excluded, and it is
always counted as oie of the ten days
within which a party cited is to appear
and answer. It is excluded by jurisprudence in the short delays, two days to
confirm a judgment by default; two
days allowed the accusedin capital cases,
after service of copy of indictment and
jury list, before he can be put upon his
trial ; and three days allowed, for a motion for a new trial, all of which must
be juridical days.
By the Judiciary Act of 1789, 23,
Sundays are expressly excluded in computing the ten days within which a writ
of error must be taken to operate as a
supersedeas; and this was extended, by
a subsequent Act of Congress, to appeals
to the Supreme Court of the United
States.
By the Roman law two days were
allowed for an appeal, where the party
managed his own case, and three days,
where it was conducted by an attorney
or other representative. By the 23d
Novel, Justinian increased the delay
to ten days, to be reckoned a recitatione
sententice. In any case the dies a quo
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was not counted, but the dies ad quem
was.
"Sedpreterillumdiem (the dies a quo),
tres alios, arbitrioejus qui dilationem impetravit, relictos esse." Voet ad randectas, Tome 1, p. 153, No. 14. See
also Spanish law, Ilustracion la Curia
Philipica,' Tom. 1, part 1, 16, No. 5;
French law, Sirey & Villeneuve, 1834,
part 2, page 357 ; 3 J. J. Marshall
(Ky.) 202,; 1 Blackford 392; 4 Wash.
240; 2 Witllace 190, for the American
Rule; and 1 Lord Raymond 280,2 Roll.
Abridgment 520, pl. 5, for the English
Rule, the same as that of the Roman
law.
In computing delays the days were
taken consecutively, sacrificial days, holidays, dies non juridici, being counted
with the others :" Ceterum continua suntdilationumtempora, connumeratisetiam diebusferiatis."
Voet, ut supra. " Ferim autem, sive repentine sire solemnes sint, dilationum
temporibus non excipiantur, sed his connumeratis." Cod. Lib. 3, tit. xi. 1. 3.
So, inthe Spanish law, as far back as
the time of Alfonso the Wise, 1222 to
1284: En el tiempo de los plazos, que los
omes han para alarseo para seguir sus
algadas, tambien denen y ser contados los
diasferiados, como los otros." Las Siete
Partidas, Ley 24, part 3, tit. 23. See
also Tapia, Febro. novismo. tom. 4, lib.
3, tit. 2, ch. 2, p. 279.
There is also a Latin version of this
law 24 of the Partidas, not a literal
translation, rather a paraphrase, by
Gregorio Lopez, as follows:" Tempera a judice assignataad persequendum appellationem sunt continua, in
quibus computantur dies feriati."
If the last day, the dies fatalis, dies
temporalis, fell upon a holiday, or any
dies non juridicus,the preceding day was
to be observed as the last day :" Si forte temporales in feriatos dies
quoquo modo inciderintprmcedenteseos dies,

ut temporales a litigantibus observentur."
Cod. lib. 7, tit. 63, 1. 2.

In the old French law, anterior to the
Code Napoleon, the Rule was, as stated
by D6nisart, in his Collection of Jurisprudence, to include Sundays and holidays:"Dars les dilais pour les assignations
mme pourle payment des lettresde change,
lesjours de dimanches et fetes solennelles,
se computent." Ap. Verb. "D61ai."
In the present French law, under the
Code Napoleon, the rule is the same;
even terminal Sundays being counted.
See Sirey & Villeneuve, 1849, part 2,
415.
A delay of eight days was allowed for
filing an opposition to a judgment by
default. The last day was Sunday, and
the opposition filed on the following
Monday, was held to be too late.
"fLa loi n distinguepasentre le cas oa
le dernier jour est bien an dimanche, pour
excepter le cas de la ragle generate."
Journal du Palais 10, p. 210. Ibid. 546.
In a prosecution for theft, there was
judgment on the 14th May. Ten days
were allowed within which an appeal
might be taken. The 24th was Sunday;
and the appeal was taken on the 25th,
Monday. It was urged that the clerk's
office was closed on Sunday; but the
court held the rule imperative, and dismissed the appeal. Jour. du Pal. 10,
697.
Three days were allowed within which
an appeal might be taken from the judgment of a justice. The judgment was
rendered on the 7th September. Sunday
was the 10th ; and the appeal was taken
on the lth, londay. It was dismissed,
not being in time. Jour. du Pal. 23,
506. See also Jour. du Pal. 46, 544.
No one supposes that Sundays are to
be omitted in counting the 30, or 60, or
90 days after date, in bills of exchange
and promissory notes; and where the
third day of grace falls on Sunday, the
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preceding Saturday is the last day,
and ten days within which an appeal
is
protest on Monday would be too late
allowed by section 8, then all the SunIt would be difficult to find rules
general, so well established by authoi so days, &c., which may occur in the other
ity delays, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14,
20, 60, 90 days,
in Europe and America, in ancient I
and in modern law, as those regulati aw must also be excluded. There is nothing
Ing to distinguish the ten days within
which
the computation of any number of di
prescribed by statute. In the short dels ays an appeal must be taken, from the ten
Ms days within which the register
is reof less than a week, in some of i
;he quired, by section 27, to prepare a list
states, Sundays are not counted.
conventional delays, it is held, in N In of creditors ; cr the ten days within
York, that if the contract be one n3w which the assignee is required to give
ot bond, by section 13; and so, with respect
entitled to days of grace, the termin
Sunday is not counted. In Pennsylvani al to all the prescribed numbers of days.
a, c Ten days" can mean nothing
else than
where the last day for an appeal fe
on Sunday, the appeal taken on tI11 ten periods of 24 hours each ; and where
ie the statute says ; cten days," without
quafolowing Monday was held to be 1
time. In some of the Rules of Cour II lification orrestriction, the courts have no
t, right or power to exclude Sundays,
Sundays are wholly omitted, while i
&c.,
n and thus to extend the prescribed period
others the terminal Sunday only is ea
:- beyond the limitations of the law.
eluded, in computing delays. But, wit
h
No part of the Bankrupt Act refers
these exceptions and modifications, th
e to the mode of computing any prescribed
general rules of computation may b
e number of days except section
48; and,
thus stated :as one of the avowed purposes of this
I. Wherp an act is to be done withir
n section is to fix the computation of time
a certain number of days, the day fro
L the conclusion is irresistible that the
and after which the act is to be done, i
Congress has, in this section, established
excluded, and the day on which the acd
fill the exclusions which were contemis to be donp, the last day, is included.
plated, or intended to be allowed
2. The days are to be counted conse; and,
that, so far as Sundays, &o.;- are concutively, includingintervening Sundays,
cerned,
the exclusion is exceptional,
&c., except where such days are exlimited to the one single contingency
pressly excluded.
mentioned, when such day happens to be
3, Where the law has not otherwise
expressly provided, if the last day, the last day, numerically, of the prescribed number of days.
numerically, falls on Sunday, &c., the
An appeal, therefore, is not in
time,
preceding Saturday, &c., must be obaccording to sections 8 and 48, and Rule
seryed as the terminal day.
26, unless it is taken within ten conseSections 8, 11, 13, 14, 27, 29, 39, 40,
cutive
days, as they come in the calen42, of the Bankrupt Act, and Rules of
Court 13, 21, 23, 24, 26, prescribe dar, after the entry of the decision
various terms of delay, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, appealed from, excluding the day of the
20, 60, 90 days. In each and all of entry, and including the last day, except in the single case in which the last
these cases the number of days is menday falls on Sunday, &., a contingency
tioned in the same way, so many days
without qualification, and without refer- expressly provided for in section 48, the
only par.t of the Bankrupt Act which
ence to the omission or exclusion of any
authorizes the exclusion of any day in
day. If intermediate Sundays, &c., are
to be excluded in the computation of the the computation of time.
R. & H. M.&a.
VoL. XIX.-4

SMITH v. BROTHERLINE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SMITH v. BROTHERLINE.
An attorney, employed or consulted as such, to draw a deed or an application
for an original title to land, is in the line of his profession, and is precluded from
buying in, for his own use, any outstanding title.
The relation between him and his client is confidential, and whether he acts
upon information derived from him, or from any other source, he is affected with
a trust.
But where an attorney was consulted and drew an application for certain land
on which the client's improvements were supposed to be, and it appeared afterwards by a more accurate survey that the improvements were on a different
tract, the subsequent purchase of the latter tract By the attorney in ignorance of
the fact that his client's improvements were on it, will not be held to be in trust.
A verdict for "1all land lying in C. county down to the line established by G.
and V. in 1849," the said line being the public recorded boundary line of a
county, is sufficiently certain.
In ejectment, plaintiff's title was derived from a sale for taxes by the trearurer
of Cambria county in 1822. The lands in suit were on or near the boundary line,
and from the generality of the description of the boundary lines in the act incorporating the county, it could not be ascertained whether the lands were in the
county or not. By a later Act of 1849 commissioners were appointed to "correctly run and distinctly mark the boundary line, &e., agreeably to the acts defining" the same. Held, that in the absence of evidence proving the existence and
recognition of a different line by the officers of the county at the time of the sale
in 1822, the line established by the commissioners under the Act of 1849 must
be treated as the original and true line.

ACTION of ejectment in the Common Pleas of Cambria county,
in which there was a verdict for plaintiff; whereupon defendant
brought this writ of error.
The opinion of the court wa-s delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-The principle of law invoked by the plaintiff
in error is happily settled, and clear above and beyond all contention. A counsel or attorney, employed and consulted as such,
to draw a deed or an application for an original title for land, is
in the line of his profession, and is precluded from buying in, for
his own use, any outstanding title. The relation between him
and his client is confidential, and whether he acts upon information derived from him or from any other source, he is affected
with a trust: Galbraith v. -Elder, 8 Watts 94; Cleavinger v.
1eimar, 3 W. & S. 486; Hfenry v. Baiman, 1 Casey 354. This
is on the ground of policy, not of fraud; for the attorney may
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be entirely innocent of any intention to deceive, and act in the
most perfect good faith. It is of the utmost importance that
men should be able to intrust, with entire safety, their most secret
interests to their professional advisers. Hence the rule is an
unbending one, and without exception, that where the attorney
buys in a title outstanding or adverse to land as to which he has
been consulted or employed, he buys for his client if the client,
should elect to take it, The cestui que trust must of course, if he
asks the interposition of a chancellor to assist him, do equity by
reimbursing the outlay and costs of the trustee, unless it may be
in a case of manifest fraud intended and attempted to be perpetrated.
But the evidence in the court below failed to show any case to
warrant the application of the principle. Mr. Brotherline was
not consulted or employed in regard to the premises involved in
this ejectment. They included two of a block of connected surveys, known as the Barton surveys. At the request of John R.
Smith, he drew for him an application to the surveyor-general
"for 400 acres of land, situate in Antis township, Blair county,
and Clearfield township, Cambria county, Pennsylvania, adjoining lands included in the survey of Benjamin R. Morgan on the
Barton on the
east, and lands included in the survey of west." By the terms of this paper the Barton surveys were
expressly excluded. The plaintiff was not consulted as to the
title of the Barton surveys, or as to any land included within
them. It is true that it is added, "on which said tract of land
-there is an improvement, erected and occupied by the subscriber
since the 27th day of November, A. D. 1852." This was inserted.
to enable the land office to compute the interest due to the Commonwealth on the purchase-money, and to fix, incidentally, and
conclusively as to the applicant, the date of the inception of his
right by settlement as against any intervening claims. But it
now appears that the fact was not as asserted; that the improvement was not erected on the land applied for, but on other land
not included; in fact on a part of the Barton surveys, expressly
excluded. There is not a spark of evidence, nor is it even pretended that Mr. Brotherline knew, when he drew the application,
or afterwards at any time before he purchased the Barton surveys,
that the defendant Smith's improvement was upon them. How,
then, can it be pretended that he stood in a confidential relation
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as regards these surveys, any more than if he had bought warranted land one hundred miles off, upon which his client had a
claim by settlement? The learned judge below took the decision
of no question of fact from the jury; for there was no evidence
upon which any such question could arise. He might have contented himself with a simple and absolute direction to find for the
plaintiff on his paper title. This disposes of all the assignments
of error except the Tth, which excepts to the verdict as insensible
and void for want of certainty.
The title of the plaintiff below was deduced through a sale for
taxes by the treasurer of Cambria county in 1822. He could
grant no such title for lands beyond the then ascertained and
settled limits of the county, and a subsequent change in them
could not enlarge the right of the purchaser. Hence it became a
question, what was the county line in 1822, as the Barton surveys lay upon the boundary. Cambria county was erected and
laid off from parts of Huntingdon and Somerset by the 6th section
of the Act of Assembly of March 26th 1804 (4 Smith ITI), and,
so far as the line in question is concerned, it was therein described
as from "the south-westerly corner of Centre county, on the heads
of Mushanon creek southerly along the Allegheny Mountain to
Somerset and Bedford county lines," and, by the 7th section, the
governor was directed, as soon as convenient, to appoint three
commissioners to run the lines. Either this was never done, or
no record wvas made of it. At all events, an Act of Assembly
was passed on March 29th 1849 (Pamph. L. 260), appointing
James L. Given, of Blair county, and E. A. Vickroy, of Cambria
county, "to correctly run and distinctly mark the boundary line
or lines between the counties of Blair and Cambria, agreeably to
the Acts of Assembly defining the boundaries of said counties."
They were directed to transmit a copy of their report and plots
to the commissioners of each county. These duties were performed by them. Some evidence was given of a survey of part
of the line previously, but the authority under which it was made
did not appear. No witness could identify any marks on the
ground. The jury were instructed that if there was no other line
than that indicated by the Act of Assembly erecting the county,
then the fixing that line by the commissioners appointed for that
purpose, by the Act of 1849, should be regarded as indicating
where it was and had been; unless there was evidence which
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showed that the officers of the county at the same time recognised
. another. No error has been assigned to this part of the charge,
and the verdict was for the plaintiff "for all the land lying in
Cambria county, down to the line established by Mr. Given and
E. A. Vickroy, in the year 1849." 'Now, if the jury had found
any other line in this general way, and referred to by the evidence, oral or written, given on the trial, without describing it
with reasonable certainty, it might have been bad, according to
ifagey v. -Detweiler, 11 Casey 409; O'Keson v. Silverthorn, 7 W.
& S. 246. But these cases recognise it as settled that the verdict
may describe a tra'ct by reference to something of a permanent
and public nature, as a recorded deed, or a diagram filed in court,
like the draft of a road in the Quarter Sessions. Indeed, this
court went much further, and held, in Tyson v. _Passmore, 7 Barr
273, that a verdict for 82J acres of land, being the land covered
by the warrant of survey of July 1832, was sufficiently certain.
If the verdict enables the court to give judgment, and the sheriff
to deliver possession, where that is required in a hlabere facias
posse8sionem, it will not be disturbed. Oportet quod res certa
deducatur in Judicium, but id certum est quod certum realdiyotest:
Green v. Watrous, 17 S. & R. 393. Now, nothing can well be
stated more clearly falling within these principles than the public
recorded boundaxy line of a county, made. under an Act of
Assembly, and filed with a plot in the office of the commissioners.
Judgment affirmed.

United States Circuit Court, District of South Carolina.
LIVINGSTON AND WIFE ET

L. v.

JORDAN.

During the late civil war the courts of South Carolina had no jurisdiction over
parties residing in M1aryland by which their rights could be injuriously affected,
although suit was commenced by said parties in the courts of South Carolina
before the war, and the proceedings were in regard to land in that state. The
jurisdiction, however it attached, was suspended during the war.
The stepfather as next friend of two infants filed a petition in chancery in South
Carolina, asking a decree to confirm a certain sale of land of the infants, situate
in South Carolina. After reference to a commissioner a decree of confirmation
was made and a deed executed by the commissioner to the purchaser. The stepfather and infants resided in Maryland, and the petition set forth that the stepfather
was guardian, but in fact both infants had at the time of filing the petition attained
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the age at which guardianship ceased in Maryland, and both became sui jurisby
the laws of South Carolina before the decree. Held, that the court of equity bad
no jurisdiction to make the decree, and no title passed to the purchaser.
THIS was an action of trespass to try title. The plaintiffs,
Mary Livingston (formerly McRa) and Julia McRa, in 1861 were
possessed of certain land in South Carolina. On February 12th
of that year their stepfather, Henry Oelrichs, as their next
friend, filed a petition in the Court of Chancery of Sumter District, S. C., setting forth that the parties were citizens and residents of Maryland; that Oelrichs was the guardian of the infants
in Maryland; that the infants were entitled to certain lands in
South Carolina under the will of D. McRa; that said lands were
now unproductive; that a contract of sale had been made for said
lands'subject to the leave of this court; and praying a decree
that -the contract of sale be approved and a conveyance be made
accordingly.
A guardian ad litem was. appointed by the Chancellor, and the
case referred to a commisioner who, on 28th of March 1861,
reported that Mary had arrived at the age of twenty-one years
on February 16th 1861 (four days after the filing of the petition),
and Julia was twenty on March 6th 1861 ; that Oelrichs had been
guardian, but that by the laws of Maryland guardianship of
female infants ceased at the age of eighteen years, and Oelrichs
had been regularly discharged as guardian in 1859; and that
the proposed sale would be for the benefit of the petitioners.
Upon this report the Chancellor, on March 29th 1861, decreed
that the sale be made upon terms prescribed. On April 5th 1862
the commissioner reported that the purchaser had not complied
with the terms of the decree within the time specified, but was
now desirous of doing so, and on April 7th 1862 the Chancellor
entered a decretal order that compliance by the purchaser with
certain terms therein specified should be regarded as a compliance
with the terms of the original decree, and thereupon the commissioner should execute a deed of conveyance of all the right, title,
&c., of the said petitioners to the purchaser. The purchaser
having complied with this order, a deed was made by the commissioner to him October 29th 1862. Defendant in this action was
in possession under title derived from this deed.
Subsequently the commissioner reported that the fund was
unproductive, and that the parties to whom it was due were
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residents of Maryland, beyond the Confederate lines, and the
money could not be remitted to them. Thereupon the court
ordered the fund to be invested in Confederate bonds.
CHASE, C. J., charged the jury as follows :-This is an action
of trespass upon the case to try title. There is very little in it
for you to pass upon. The question of fact lies within a very
narrow compass. The only question of importance in the case is
a question of law.
It is very clear that this contract, made between Mr. Moses as
solicitor and Mr. Robertson the purchaser, did not bind the plaintiffs. It was a contract without authority from them. No person
has a right to intervene as a volunteer for a minor child, and
make a contract for the sale of a minor's estate.
This is so clear that it needs no argument. If, however, as
apparently in this case, a person does intervene and make such
a contract, it may become binding by subsequent assent of the
parties, on arriving at full age, or through proper proceedings in
a court of equity.
There is no allegation in this case, that we have heard, of any
such subsequent assent of these parties. You have heard the
testimony of Chief Justice Moses. He stated distinctly there
was no intercourse between him and these minor children in relation to this contract. It was made solely at the instance of their
mother and stepfather. So far as their consent goes, therefore,
it may be laid out of the case. The next question is, whether
there is any jurisdiction in a court of equity of South Carolina to
make a decree confirming the contract, or for the sale of the
minors' estate. Upon that point we entertain very serious doubts.
Undoubtedly an infant may bring suit by next friend in a court
of equity; and the court has jurisdiction in such a suit to make
an order giving authority to sell the estate of the infant. There
is no question upon that point. In this case, however, the suit
was brought by the stepfather, representing himself as next friend
of the minors; but he himself resides in Maryland, beyond the
jurisdiction of the court in which the suit was brought. , Though
represented as the guardian of the minors, he was not such in fact.
He had ceased to be the guardian of one, under the laws of Maryland, for more than two years, and of the other for nearly two.
One of the heirs became of age, according to the laws of South
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Carolina, four days after the suit was brought, and the other long
before the final decretal order, under which the defendant claims
title; and neither was ever brought formally into court.
As we have already said, we doubt upon the question of jurisdiction; but for the purposes of this case will rule that jurisdiction to confirm this contract made in behalf of the minors, or to
pass the final decretal order under which the title was conveyed,
did not exist. The defendant, if dissatisfied, may move in arrest
of judgment, or for a new trial.
Under this ruling, gentlemen, your verdict must be for the
plaintiff; for if there was no jurisdiction in the court, the defendant cannot protect himself by its decree.
It is proper to say, further, that although we. put this case for
the present upon the absence of jurisdiction in the state court to
confirm or order the sale, there is another objection to the defendant's title, equally fatal.
The jurisdiction of the state court over the plaintiffs, whatever
it was, terminated when the civil war broke out. Upon that point
we entertain no doubt. As between parties residing in the state
of South Carolina and parties residing in the states which adhered
to the National Government, between whom war made intercourse
impossible, there could be no jurisdiction in the courts of South
Carolina, while the war continued, by which the rights of nonresidents could be injuriously affected.
This ruling, indeed, applies only to the orders made during the
war; it is decisive, however, of this case.
We charge you, gentlemen, that the courts of South Carolina
had no jurisdiction of these plaintiffs, and no jurisdiction to make
any order prejudicial to their rights during the war.
These instructions, gentlemen, leave nothing for your determination but the question of damages. The measure of damages
must be the amount of net profits made by the defendant from
the plantation. The defendant, in this case, is Mr. Jordan, not
the original purchaser, Mr. Robertson. If you have heard any
evidence of profits made by him, you will give damages to that
extent.
The jury found for plaintiff; damages one cent, on which the
court entered judgment, and issued a writ of habere facias vosses8ionem.

IN RE BECKERKORD.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern -Districtof Missouri.
MATTER OF HENRY BECKERKORD, BANKRUPT.
That part of the 14th section of the Bankrupt Act which adopts the state exemption laws in force in 1864 as the measure of property to be exempted under
proceedings in bankruptcy, is uniform in its operation among the states, and is
therefore constitutional.
By the exemption laws of Missouri, in force in 1864, a homestead may be set
apart to a debtor out of a leasehold in real estate, or where such leasehold is not
susceptible of division he may retain $1000 out of the proceeds of it.

THIS was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court. At
the time Beckerkord was declared a bankrupt he was the owner
of an unexpired term of a -leasehold estate. The value thereof,
as appeared from a sale made by the assignees, was $1490. After
the sale the bankrupt, by his counsel, appeared before the register and claimed $1000 of the proceeds of the sale in lieu of a
homestead, which claim was resisted by assignees. The register
thereupon certified the case to the District Court of the Eastern
District, and TREAT, J., allowed the claim, and ordered the
amount to be paid by the assignees. From this order the
assignee appealed to this court.
A. Binswanger, for the assignee.-In some twelve states no
homestead exemptions existed in 1864, while in other states 'there
is a great diversity as to the amount and value of the homestead
exempt. In many eastern states a homestead of the value of
only $500 is allowed exempt from execution, while in other states
a much greater amount is exempt. In California $5000 in value
is exempt. In Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Arkansas there is no
limitation as to value or extent of the homested.
These exemptions not beipg uniform fall within the inhibition
of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States,
which gives Congress the power to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States.
Congress cannot do that indirectly which it cannot do directly.
Having fio power to embody the various homestead exemptions
of the various states in the law itself, it cannot do it indirectly
by inserting such a clause as this, and there is no uniformity in
the law as required by the Constitution.
Charles B. Pearce,for the bankrupt.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
KREKEL, J.-It is admitted that the bankrupt is the head of a
family. The 14th section of the Bankrupt Law, after excepting
certain specific articles, goes on to exempt "such other property
as now is or hereafter shall be exempted from attachment or
seizure or levy on execution by the laws of the United States,
and such other property not included in the foregoing exceptions
as is exempted from levy and sale upon execution or other process
or order of any court, by the laws of the state in which the bankrupt has his domicile at the time of the commencement of the
proceedings in bankruptcy, to an amount not exceeding that
allowed by such state exemption laws in force in the year 1864."
The laws of Missouri in 1864 exempted among other property
from sale under execution or other process, "when owned by
the head of a family or wife who shall be a bond fide resident of
the state, any of his or her real estate not exceeding 160 acres of
farming land, or one lot in town or city in value $1000, at the
date of such exemption, to be held and enjoyed by such party as
a homestead." After providing for setting apart of homestead
and ascertaining the value thereof, the law proceeds to enact that
"when the real estate owned by the head of a family is of greater
value than the amount allowed as the value of a homestead, and
is not susceptible of division, such real estate may be sold, and
the officer shall pay over to the defendant in such execution the
amount or value of a homestead exempted under the provision of
the act." The act has the usual provision making it inapplicable
to liabilities contracted before the taking effect thereof.
Two questions are suggested for our consideration. First, can a
homestead be carved out of a leasehold estate, and if so, secondly,
is that part of the*t4th section of the Bankrupt Law making the
exemption constitutional.
The language of the Missouri statute in reference to title is,
that he or she must be owner of the real estate in order to have a
homestead exempted. It is argued that there can be no such
ownership as the law here contemplates in a leasehold estate, and
hence no homestead can be carved out of it. By the 17th section
of the Missouri statutes relating to executions, it is enacted that
leases upon land for any unexpired term of three years and more,
shall be subject to execution and sold as real property.
The term real property is defined by the 38th section of the

IN RE BECKERKORD.

general provisions of the same statute as including every estate,
interest, and right in land. These provisions seem to us to solve
the question suggested in favor of the bankrupt, entitling him to
have a homestead set apart in the leasehold owned by him at the
time he was declared a bankrupt.
The second question presented and urged with earnestness is
the unconstitutionality of that part of section 14th of the Bank-'
rupt Law, making the homestead exemption.
"Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States," is the language of the Constitution by which the grant is made. It is
insisted that the 14th section, already cited, having adopted the
exemption laws of the state in which the bankrupt is domiciled,
and these exemptions having no regard to uniformity, violate the
constitutional provision authorizing uniform laws throughout the
United States to be passed. It is obvious, from the language
employed, that the uniformity here referred to was a uniformity
among the states. If Congress saw cause to pass bankrupt laws
under the grant of power referred to, the injunction is that they
shall be uniform throughout the United States. So far as the
distribution of the bankrupt's assets-the point under consideration-is concerned, the law is uniform. When viewed with reference-to the state exemption laws, there is a uniformity which, on
reflection, readily suggests itself. Though the states vary in the
extent of their exemptions, yet what remains the Bankrupt Law
distributes equally among the creditors. Nor does the Bankrupt
Law in any way vary or change the rights of the parties. All
contracts are made with reference to existing laws, and no creditor
could recover more from his debtor under the state laws than the
unexempted part of his assets, the very thing that is attained by
the Bafikrupt Law, which, therefore, is strictly uniform.
To establish the uniformity contended for would have made it
necessary for Congress to have virtually abrogated all state exemption laws. In doing so it would necessarily have legislated
against the debtor class, by making whatever property that was
exempt, at the time of contracting, subject to distribution. This
certainly would not have tended either to uniformity, justice, or
equality. But the power to abrogate state exemption laws has
never been claimed for Congress, but on the contrary, such laws
have been upheld and declared constitutional, when not applied

